![]() En este trabajo exploro algunas consecuencias interesantes de RK: (a) en ocasiones, al 111-142, 2013.Williamson defiende la regla del conocimiento, RK, sobre las aseveraciones: debemos aseverar que p sólo Teleological Justification of Argumentation Schemes. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. WALTON, Douglas REED, Christopher MACAGNO, Fabrizio. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984. TOULMIN, Stephen RIEKE, Richard JANIK, Allan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958. Ithaca e Londres: Cornell University Press, 1989. Dialectic and its place in the development of Medieval logic. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015. Ordinary Meaning: A Theory of the Most Fundamental Principle of Legal Interpretation. Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts. Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation. Interpreting statutes: a comparative study. Pragmatic Maxims and Presumptions in Legal Interpretation. MACAGNO, Fabrizio WALTON, Douglas SARTOR, Giovanni. The pragmatics of quotation and reporting. ![]() Classifying the patterns of natural arguments. Defaults and inferences in interpretation. Implicatures and conflicts of presumptions. Topics in Contemporary Legal Argumentation: Some Remarks on the Topical Nature of Legal Argumentation in the Continental Law Tradition. A Left Phenomenological Critique of the Hart/ Kelsen Theory of Legal Interpretation. The syntax-pragmatics merger: Belief reports in the theory of Default Semantics. Default semantics: Foundations of a compositional theory of acts of communication. ![]() Washington University Law Quarterly 73: pp. Vehicles of meaning: unconventional semantics and unbearable interpretation. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997. Christopher Reed and Christopher Tindale, pp. An examination of Douglas Walton’s theories of reasoning and argument, ed. In Dialectics, dialogue and argumentation. An overview of the Carneades argumentation support system. Wisconsin International Law Journal 15: pp. When common law courts interpret civil codes. ![]() Transparency and doubt: understanding and interpretation in pragmatics and in law. Amsterdão: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2003.ĭASCAL, Marcelo WRÓBLEWSKI, Jerzy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.ĭASCAL, Marcelo. On the Issue of Contraposition of Defeasible Rules. Nova Iorque: Routledge, 2011.ĬAMINADA, Martin. Logic, Probability, and Presumptions in Legal Reasoning. Using argument schemes for hypothetical reasoning in law. Nova Iorque: Academic Press, 1981.īENCH-CAPON, Trevor PRAKKEN, Henry. It-clefts, informativeness and logical form: Radical pragmatics (revised standard version). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2008.ĪTLAS, Jay David LEVINSON, Stephen. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1970.ĪTLAS, Jay David. The defeasibility conditions of each scheme are summarized in a set of critical questions, which identify the default conditions for accepting interpretative arguments and provide a method for evaluating a given argument as weak or strong.ĪBAELARDUS, Petrus. ![]() This translation of interpretative arguments into argumentation schemes is illustrated in detail considering two specific arguments, the psychological and the a contrario arguments. The process of statutory interpretation is shown to have a specific argumentative structure where the conclusion corresponds to the disputed or questionable meaning attributed to a legal source and needs to be supported and attacked through defeasible arguments. In this paper, the logical structures of the interpretative arguments summarizing the various interpretative canons considered fundamental by Tarello (1980) are represented by argumentation schemes, namely patterns of defeasible arguments combined with their corresponding critical questions. A natureza refutável de cada esquema é demonstrada por meio de questões críticas que identificam as condições padrão para a aceitação de argumentos interpretativos e fornecem um método para avaliar a força ou a fraqueza de um determinado argumento. Esta transformação de argumentos de interpretação numa estrutura de esquemas argumentativos é analisada em detalhe em dois argumentos, o argumento psicológico e o argumento a contrario. Defende-se que o processo de interpretação da lei tem uma estrutura argumentativa distinta na qual a conclusão, nomeadamente o significado disputável ou questionado atribuído a uma fonte jurídica, é uma afirmação que necessita ser respaldada por argumentos refutáveis a favor ou contra. Neste artigo demonstra-se como os esquemas argumentativos (esquemas que representam argumentos refutáveis, combinados com perguntas críticas correspondentes), podem ser usados para representar a estrutura lógica dos vários tipos de argumentos reconhecidos como fundamentais na interpretação da lei por Tarello (1980). ![]()
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |